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Introduction
I take a human group to be a collection of individual human beings whose iden-
tity as a group over time, or over counterfactual possibilities, need not require 
sameness of membership. The typical group can remain the same group even as 
its membership changes, with some members leaving or dying, others joining or 
being born into the group. As we envisage the possibility of changes in the mem-
bership of such a group, even ones that are never going to materialize, we think of 
them as changes in one and the same, continuing entity.1
This conception of a group distinguishes it from a set or collection, where a 
change of members necessarily entails a change of set. But it still encompasses a 
generous range of social bodies, since it says nothing about the basis on which we 
individuate a group over time or possibility. It allows us to take almost any prop-
erty, whether of origin or ethnicity, belief or commitment, career or hobby, even 
height or weight, to fix the identity of a group. The Irish, the Catholics, the lawyers, 
the stamp collectors and the obese can constitute groups. Thus while groups may 
vary in how important their individuating property is, and in how far it is socially 
significant for members or non-members, the information that a collection con-
stitutes a group is no big news.
Among groups in this common, downbeat sense, however, some stand out 
from the crowd. These are groups that perform as agents, incorporating in a 
way that enables them to mimic the performance of individual human beings. 
They make judgments, form commitments, plan initiatives and, relying 
1 As Chad McIntosh has reminded me, a group might be defined so that it is required to have cer-
tain individuals as members. Hence the cautious phrasing about the difference between collections 
and groups.
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on members who act in their name, undertake actions in any of a range of 
domains. Examples are the partnerships and companies that operate in com-
mercial space, the associations and movements that characterize civil soci-
ety, and the churches and states that shape the lives of people throughout the 
world. Such entities certainly involve collections of individuals in coordinated 
relationships, and they certainly count as groups since they are individuated 
by their common acquiescence in what is done in their name. But their capac-
ity to act, and more generally to perform as agents, marks them out. They are 
a class apart.
This claim is not uncontentious, however, since there are many instances where 
we ascribe agent-like features to groups without any real suggestion that they 
count as agents proper. Thus we say that the bond market is unsettled by the inde-
cisiveness of the Eurozone leadership, or that the X-generation has lost its affec-
tion for video games, or that the sun-worshippers on a beach acted courageously 
in helping to save a swimmer in difficulty. Yet most of us will agree that the bond 
market is just a network of bond traders, each with his or her own goals; that the 
X-generation is just the collection of people born between about 1965 and 1980, 
allegedly characterized by certain shared traits; and that if those on the beach acted 
courageously, that just means that they each played a part in a coordinating plan, 
not that they formed a distinct agent. In none of these cases is there a serious can-
didate for the role of a group agent.
If I am to support my belief in group agents, then, I have to be able to give an 
account of how we can tell bona fide group agents apart from mere pretenders 
like these. That is what I try to do in this paper, building on work done jointly with 
Christian List (2011). I begin with a discussion of agency in general, distinguish-
ing between non-personal and personal agency, and argue that we have a special 
way of detecting personal agency: by the direct experience or indirect evidence of 
interpersonal engagement. And then I try to show that under plausible epistemic 
scenarios such experience or evidence is necessary for the ascription of agency to 
a group.
The paper is in four main sections. In the first I provide a general account of 
agency, concentrating on simple cases. In the second I argue for the distinctions 
advertised between different modes of agency and of agency-detection. And in 
the third I use this material to argue that in our ordinary practice only direct or 
indirect evidence of interpersonal engagement provides a warrant for ascribing 
agency to groups. This means that the only group agents that we generally rec-
ognize are agents of a personal kind and in the final section, connecting with the 
work done with Christian List (2011), I argue that such group agents count as real, 
non-fictional agents.
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4.1. The Conception of Agency
A system is an agent insofar as it is organized to instantiate a set of goals and a set 
of representations and to pursue those goals in accordance with those representa-
tions. This notion of an agent is best introduced with a simple example. Imagine 
that you return home one evening to find that your whiz-kid sister has set up a 
knee-high robot in the kitchen, which she invites you to observe. You see that it 
has bug-like eyes that appear to scan the room, wheels on which it can move about, 
and arms suited to lifting and adjusting objects up to its own size. Your sister drops 
a can on the floor and, to your surprise, the robot moves towards it, lifts it in an 
awkward embrace, then takes it to a trash bin in the corner and deposits it there. 
Amazed, you check for reliability by dropping an orange on the ground and, once 
again, the robot makes its way to the orange, lays hold of it with its arms, and takes 
it to be deposited in the bin. You double-check on its capacity by moving the robot, 
the trash bin and the orange to another room and, as before, you find that the robot 
performs up to par. You carry on with similar checks and it turns out that with only 
a few exceptions the robot performs quite reliably to this pattern.
There is a clear sense in which this system gives evidence of being a goal-seeking, 
representation-guided system and makes a claim to count as an agent: it more or 
less reliably acts to realize a certain goal or purpose according to more or less reli-
able representations. The goal is that things on the floor are put in the bin; this 
counts as a goal insofar as it is a condition whose non-fulfillment prompts rectify-
ing action on the robot’s part. The representations are states in the agent that pro-
vide information about the environment; these count as representations insofar as 
they come and go with the presence and absence of the conditions on which they 
provide information. The robot is so organized that, depending on whether or not 
its representations indicate that there is an object on the floor, it will act or not act; 
and depending on where the representations locate the object relative to robot and 
bin, they will guide its movements and other adjustments.
Or at least the robot is so organized that it will perform to this standard when 
independently plausible conditions of functioning are satisfied: when the lights are 
on, it is not misled by pictures of objects, its batteries are not run down, and so on. 
Assuming such conditions are met, the robot functions quite reliably in represent-
ing the environment and in acting for its goal in accordance with those represen-
tations. It is constituted so that in the absence of factors that plausibly impede its 
functioning, it reliably moves any objects on the floor to the bin area, operating on 
the basis of its reliable representational faculties. It displays that behavior in actual 
circumstances and in a range of variations on the actual circumstances where the 
goal remains relevant and attainable and its functioning—its forming and acting 
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on its representations—is not impeded. The robot is marked out as an agent by the 
evidence of this robust, if conditioned pattern of behavior.2
Is such evidence sufficient in itself to ensure that the system counts as an agent? 
Not strictly, since the system may not be organized, as I put it earlier, so as to 
behave in the purpose-driven, representation-guided mode described; it may do 
so under purely external rigging. It may turn out to be following instructions, for 
example, from a spatially distant controller like a marionette (Peacocke 1983). Or 
it may be conforming to a look-up tree, implanted by a temporally distant control-
ler who foresaw every situation the system might confront and pre-programmed 
its response (Block 1981). But if the system is enduringly organized within itself 
so that it displays the required pattern of behavior, then there can be no room for 
doubt about its agential status (Jackson and Pettit 1990a; Jackson 1992).
The robust pattern of behavior displayed by the toy system of our example is 
about as simple as it is possible to imagine. But we can see that a similar story can 
hold as we go to more and more complex patterns, and more and more complex 
agents. The purposes pursued by agents may be multiple, and variously ordered. 
The representations formed by agents may extend into a number of sensory 
modalities, they may assume the form of memories as well as current representa-
tions, they may become abstract or propositional as well as concrete or percep-
tual, and they may include representations of how things might be as well as of 
how things actually are. And those representations, as well as the purposes they 
serve, may be endorsed in degrees, as well as in the on-off manner envisaged so 
far. The variations and developments possible are legion and are evident across 
the spectrum from simple to complex robots, from simple to complex non-human 
animals, and from non-human animals to our own kind. Still, despite complexities 
of these kinds, the category of agency retains its common form across those vari-
ations. Each of the systems imagined, no matter how complex, is organized so as 
to reliably promote certain goals or purposes under the guidance of reliable repre-
sentations, when there are no factors present that impede its functioning (List and 
Pettit 2011, Ch 1).
This discussion of the nature of agency and the evidence for agency leaves one 
question unanswered. How robust does the conditioned pattern of behavior that 
is characteristic of agency have to be? Absent factors that impede its functioning, 
2 We cannot invoke impeding factors, it should be noticed, in a free or undisciplined manner. There 
has to be reason to posit a contingent factor that gets in the way of the operation of the system. Suppose 
that the robot performed the part described but only on a random basis. In that case we would have 
little reason for recognizing it as an agent, unless there were evidence that a particular perturber was 
randomly getting in the way.
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what range of variations ought to make no difference to the performance of an 
agent?
An extreme line on this question might be that no such variation ought to make 
any difference to the reliability of the agent in responding to evidence and execut-
ing its actions. But this is likely to be unrealistic with naturalistic, essentially lim-
ited subjects and I shall only assume that there is some threshold in variations, 
perhaps sensitive to context, such that it is enough for agency that a system proves 
to be evidentially and executively reliable beyond that threshold.
I do not have anything to say on where that threshold might lie but, wherever 
it lies, there are two fronts, internal and situational, on which any system must 
display the required degree of evidential and executive reliability (Pettit 2009). 
I defend two claims, bearing on these two forms of robustness. First, if the agent 
does not achieve internal robustness, there will be no reason to trace its behav-
ior to states like representations and purposes as distinct from the many possible 
neural or electronic realizers of those states. And, second, if it does not achieve 
situational robustness, then the states to which we trace it, even if they are multiply 
realizable, will not be fit to count as representations and purposes.
The first claim is that the purposive and representational states or attitudes that 
are taken to prompt the agent’s behavior must do so over a range of possible vari-
ations in how they are realized within the system. For example, the kitchen robot 
does not have to be given evidence of an object on the floor that strikes its bug-like 
eyes from just one particular angle, making one particular retinal impression and 
triggering one particular computational process. It responds appropriately no 
matter what the angle of vision and no matter what the retinal impression and 
computational process that realizes its representation of the object. In the absence 
of robustness over variations in the internal, physical realizers of representations 
and indeed purposes, there would be no reason to posit representations and pur-
poses at the origin of the behavior; there would be no reason to posit anything 
other than the physical realizers themselves. The claim of purposive and represen-
tational attitudes to causal relevance consists in their programming for behavioral 
responses: that is, in their leading to the responses over variations in how they are 
realized at lower levels (Jackson and Pettit 1990b; List and Menzies 2009). Absent 
internal robustness, there would be no grounds for taking them to have any such 
causal relevance to the behavior produced.
The second claim is that an agent must display a purposive-representational 
pattern of behavior over situational as well as internal variations. Assume that 
impeding factors are absent. In order for a state to count as a representation that 
p it must form in response to evidence that p and unform in response to evidence 
that not p. And in order for a state to count as a purposive state of seeking to X, it 
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must prompt different behaviors under different representations as to the oppor-
tunities and means of X-ing. This means that the representational attitude must 
form and unform in response to evidence, even when there are other variations 
in situation, and that the purposive attitude must prompt suitable initiatives over 
parallel variations; otherwise they would not count respectively as representa-
tional and purposive. Absent impeding factors, then, to take a system to act for a 
certain purpose according to a certain representation is necessarily to assume that 
it would do so over suitable situational variations: that is, variations in which the 
representation continues to be supported and the purpose continues to be capable 
of implementation.3
4.2. Two Modes of Agency and Agency-Detection
4.2.1. Personal and non-personal agency
While the considerations in the last section introduce the basic conception of 
agency with which I shall be working here, they ignore the fact that there are two 
modes of agency that stand in deep contrast with one another. On the one side there 
is what I shall describe as the non-personal agency exhibited by the toy robot—
and, I suspect, all other robots and all non-human animals. And on the other there 
is the personal agency that we human beings generally display. Non-personal 
agency, as should be clear already, comes in many varieties and appears at many 
distinct levels of sophistication; there is a deep gulf between even the family pooch 
and the kitchen-cleaning robot. But variegated as it is, non-personal agency still 
contrasts in the deepest possible fashion with our own personal form of agency.
In order to bring out the distinctive character of personal agency let me rehearse 
in a set of dot-points certain things that you—and human beings in general—can 
more or less clearly do but which no animal or robot can approximate (Pettit 1993; 
McGeer and Pettit 2002). These points are inevitably telegraphic, given restric-
tions of space, but I hope that they are intuitively clear and plausible.
•	 Like	robots	and	other	animals,	you	can	form	purposes	and	representations,	
beliefs and desires, relying on your non-intentional, usually unconscious pro-
cessing—for short, your sub-personal processing—to guide the formation of 
those attitudes under the flow of incoming evidence, perceptual and other-
wise. But you can also do much more.
3 The requirement of situational robustness is close to John Searle’s (1983) requirement that an 
agent satisfy “the background” condition of having sufficient skills to be able to adjust appropriately 
under situational variation.
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•	 You	can	assent	to,	dissent	from,	or	suspend	judgment	on	sentences	or	proposi-
tions that express attitudes you hold or might hold; and you can do this in light 
of considering the evidence for and against those propositions. A proposition 
expresses a certain attitude when acting as if the proposition were true—act-
ing as if things were as it says they are—amounts to acting according to that 
attitude. In this sense ‘p’ expresses the belief that p; ‘ “q” is attractive’ expresses 
the desire that q (as well as the belief that “q” is attractive); and ‘I will do X’ 
expresses the intention to X (as well as the belief that you will do it).
•	 In	passing	 judgment	 in	 this	way	on	a	proposition,	you	reveal—or	perhaps	
make it the case for the first time—that you hold the corresponding attitude. 
Exercising judgment over propositions is a way of forming or revealing atti-
tudes that is distinct from the spontaneous, sub-personal way of forming atti-
tudes associated with basic agency and the behavioral mode of revealing the 
attitudes that you form in that way.
•	Many	of	your	attitudes	will	be	spontaneously	formed,	of	course,	and	perhaps	
never become associated with judgment. But on pain of not being an inter-
pretable agent—even an interpretable agent for yourself—there had better be 
a general coherence between the attitudes that form spontaneously within you 
and the attitudes formed or confirmed via the exercise of judgment. In partic-
ular, the attitudes you hold spontaneously ought to expand or contract or alter 
in response to the judgments you make. Were they to come regularly apart, 
then you would have two inconsistent profiles as an agent.
•	While	 coherence	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 generally	 assured	 by	 your	 subpersonal	
make-up, judgment may come apart from attitude in particular cases. You 
may make your judgment without sufficient attention to the evidence and 
your spontaneously formed attitudes, being better attuned to evidence, may 
not vary as a result of the judgment. Or you may make your judgment thought-
fully, as when you come to reject the gambler’s fallacy, but your spontaneously 
formed attitudes may not fall in line: you may forget yourself at the casino 
table (McGeer and Pettit 2002). But you can guard against this occasional 
incoherence between assent and attitude by taking measures to ensure greater 
care in making judgments and greater caution in acting on related beliefs.
•	Assuming	coherence	between	judgment	and	attitude,	the	fact	that	you	assent	
to ‘p’ or dissent from ‘p’ will indicate that you hold the attitude that ‘p’ or ‘not-p’ 
expresses: the act of assent or dissent will induce or perhaps reveal that atti-
tude within you, ensuring the presence of a disposition to manifest associ-
ated patterns of behavior. And, assuming coherence, the fact that you suspend 
judgment on whether or not p will indicate that you hold neither attitude: you 
have an open mind.
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•	All	of	this	being	so,	you	are	able	to	prompt	the	formation	of	attitudes	in	any	
area, or at least reveal their presence—that is, bring them to consciousness—
by resort to judgment: by seeing whether or not the available evidence leads 
you to give assent to relevant propositions. You can intentionally make up 
your mind, as we say, passing judgment on whether the weather is improving 
or Pythagoras’s theorem is sound; on whether it would be fun to go to town or 
whether to take a break.
It should be clear that the capacities at which I gesture here mean that you and 
human beings in general are very different from other sorts of agents. The regular 
agent is at the mercy of the beliefs and desires and intentions that happen to form 
within it—and at the mercy of how sensitive they are to evidence—acting under 
the ebb and flow of their influence. But as a human being you are able to have a sort 
of intentional control over whether or not you form certain beliefs and desires in a 
given area, over how well the attitudes you form are faithful to available evidence 
and over whether they satisfy related conditions: whether they are consistent with 
one another, and whether they are closed under entailment.
What desires are likely to guide you in the exercise of such intentional control? 
You will want to form beliefs and other attitudes in any domain where you are 
required or otherwise motivated to act; this will be necessary for shaping what you 
do. And as a prerequisite of satisfactory agency you will want to form beliefs and 
other attitudes that are faithful to the evidence, consistent with one another and 
even to some extent closed. Any failure in such regards is liable to limit your capac-
ity to perform as an agent, your ability to act effectively for whatever purposes you 
happen to embrace.
The control you can exercise on these lines is essentially epistemic, allowing you 
to determine the matters on which you form beliefs and other attitudes and to 
promote the broadly evidential quality of the attitudes you form. But there is also 
another sort of control, evaluative rather than epistemic in character, which your 
expressive and judgmental capacities as a human being ought also to make pos-
sible. This is control over what purposes you embrace rather than control over how 
you pursue those purposes.4
On the picture sketched you are able with any desire you have—say, the desire 
that p—to register and assent to the proposition that ‘p’ is an attractive prospect; 
4 It may be more appropriate to speak of checking rather than controlling in the epistemic and 
indeed the evaluative context. In a given case your belief as to whether the evidence argues that p may 
be incorrect and your spontaneously formed belief that p correct rather than the other way around. 
But the capacity to form the evidential belief puts a check on spontaneous belief-formation, making it 
more likely that you will end up satisfying epistemic ideals (Pettit 2007).
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you can judge and believe that that is so at the same time as you are attracted 
to the prospect. But suppose, plausibly, that experience gives you a basis for 
judging that while the p-prospect is attractive here and now, it is not reliably or 
robustly attractive. Like the gratification of a passing impulse, it is a prospect 
that you will wish you hadn’t sought as you look at what you chose from the 
perspective of a later self or a perspective that you share with other people. 
If you can now predict and privilege your standpoint as an intertemporally 
enduring, interpersonally engaged self, forming beliefs about what is robustly 
attractive, it will be rational to take a critical attitude towards your current 
desire. And human experience suggests that by taking a critical attitude—by 
forming the belief, under epistemic control, that the prospect is not attrac-
tive in a suitably robust way—you can exercise a distinct evaluative control 
over your desires and purposes; the beliefs you form may provide you with the 
means of disabling offensive desires or prompting more satisfactory alterna-
tives (Smith 1994).
Assuming that you have control over how far the attitudes you form on the 
basis of available evidence are epistemically and perhaps evaluatively satisfac-
tory, you will meet standard conditions for being fit to be held responsible—fit 
to be praised or blamed—for the formation of relevant attitudes and for the 
deeds they lead you to enact (Pettit and Smith 1996). Faced with the issue of 
whether or to form a belief that p, it will be intuitively up to you whether you 
are attentive to the evidence; you will have a capacity to promote such atten-
tion, even if you fail to exercise it. And faced with the issue of whether to form 
a desire that q or that not-q, it will equally be up to you whether you form a 
desire that accords with your beliefs about the robust attractiveness—the desir-
ability—of the prospects; again you will have the required capacity, even if you 
fail to exercise it. In each case, then, you will be fit to be held responsible for 
performing well or badly by epistemic and evaluative standards in the attitudes 
you embrace or fail to embrace.
In ordinary parlance, this is to say that you will be personally responsible for 
the attitudes you form—or fail to form—as distinct from just being causally 
responsible for them. Even the simple robot or animal is causally responsible 
for the attitudes it forms, since it is the sub-personal processing of the system 
that produces those attitudes, updating in response to the evidence it confronts. 
But you will be personally responsible for relevant attitudes insofar as you can 
be called to book for them: you can be exposed to praise or blame for what you 
do or do not believe or desire or intend—and for how you consequently act or 
fail to act—whether on an epistemic or evaluative basis. It is this dimension of 
personal responsibility that leads me to describe the sort of agency that you and 
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other human beings display as a personal form of agency, distinguishing it from 
the non-personal agency of simpler systems like robots and other animals.5
4.2.2. Two ways of detecting agency
In determining whether a simple system like our robot is an agent we rely on 
induction from the evidence of how it interacts with what we may describe as an 
impersonal environment: how it performs in the limited range of cases that we 
explore as we put different objects at different places on the floor, or as we observe 
its reactions to differences introduced by other hands. It will give evidence of being 
an agent just insofar as it is disposed to act after a certain pattern in an indefi-
nite range of possible scenarios, of which the limited range explored is a subset. 
The limited range offers an inductive basis for ascribing the wider disposition. The 
existence of the disposition, realized in its internal organization, offers the best 
explanation for why it behaves as it does in the cases actually investigated.
We know from long-established psychological studies that we human beings 
have a powerful tendency to look for agency, being prompted to ascribe it even 
in cases where the systems involved—for example, the geometrical shapes in a 
simple, cartoon movie (Heider and Simmel 1944)—are manifestly incapable of 
agency. We are hair-triggered to move from the most slender behavioral evidence 
to the postulation of the robust capacities that agency requires. It’s as if we are 
pre-programmed to be animists. We worry about overlooking any agents that may 
inhabit our world and, for the sake of avoiding that possibility, we routinely run the 
risk of taking many non-agential systems to be agents proper.
But despite this readiness to leap to ascriptions of agency, we don’t primarily rely 
on induction from interaction with an impersonal environment when we ascribe 
agency to other human beings. As human beings we are personal agents. And as 
personal agents we have a special basis for recognizing the agency of other per-
sonal agents, at least to the extent that we share expressive resources. What we 
mainly rely on in ascribing agency to other human beings is induction from their 
interpersonal interaction with other persons, whether we engage directly in that 
5 Under the argument presented, of course, the domain of personal responsibility will be restricted 
to attitudes that are capable of being expressed in our common language. But that is not a particularly 
problematic constraint. If you are fit to be held responsible for forming or acting on attitudes engaging 
matters for which you and we have resources of expression—say, matters to do with the nature of the 
liquid in the glass before you, the position of that cup, and the desirability of drinking from it—then 
it will not matter that we have no words in which to express other presupposed attitudes: say, the 
sub-personal representation of the precise size of the glass, and its orientation from your body, that 
presumably plays a role in guiding your arm and the grasping motion of your fingers. We can hold 
you responsible for drinking the gin, even though we don’t hold you responsible for the precise way in 
which you grasp and raise the glass.
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interaction ourselves or have indirect evidence of the interaction in their relations 
with others.
In order to see how we can gain access to your agency, recognizing the presence 
of suitable attitudes, I add some dot-points to the list already constructed. These 
register ways in which we, as engaged interlocutors, can come to determine the 
agential presence and operation of attitudes of belief, desire, intention and the like. 
They reflect capacities that are more or less clearly within the capacity of any nor-
mal human being and within your capacity in particular.
•	Assuming	that	you	can	make	up	your	mind	on	certain	propositions,	determin-
ing your own attitudes, you can know your mind on those matters other than 
by reviewing yourself introspectively. You can test yourself on your response 
to an arbitrary proposition and depending on how you judge, you can know 
whether or not you believe the proposition—and in relevant cases hold or do 
not hold a corresponding desire or intention.
•	On	those	matters	where	you	make	up	and	know	your	mind,	you	can	speak	for	
yourself by making up your mind and displaying that knowledge publicly in 
assertion. If you assert that ‘p’ then, assuming sincerity, that will manifestly 
communicate that you have knowingly made up your mind that p and that 
you believe that p; it will amount to avowing the belief, as we say.
•	Communicating	by	avowal	that	you	believe	that	p—or	have	any	other	atti-
tude—contrasts with communicating your belief by reporting that you believe 
that p: it seems to you, as you might put it, that you believe that p. With a report 
you can excuse a later failure to act as if p in either of two ways: by explaining 
that the introspective evidence on your belief misled you; or by explaining that 
you changed your mind, say by discovering new perceptual or other evidence 
against ‘p’.
•	 In	avowing	a	belief	that	p,	communicating	that	you	have	made	up	your	mind,	
you will communicate at the same time that you cannot excuse a later failure 
to act as if p by the claim that the introspective evidence on your believing that 
p was inadequate or misleading; that would be inconsistent with your hav-
ing made up your mind which, in traditional terminology, gives you a mak-
er’s rather than a reporter’s knowledge of your attitude. The change-of-mind 
excuse will remain available but not the misleading-evidence excuse.
•	With	 any	 belief	 and	 desire	 or	 intention	 on	which	 you	 can	make	 up	 your	
mind, you have a choice between avowing and reporting it.6 The fact that 
6 If you choose to report that you have a certain attitude—say, that you believe that p—then you 
cannot help but avow a distinct attitude: your belief that you believe that p. Although you can avoid 
avowal with any particular attitude, then, you cannot avoid avowing some attitudes.
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you manifestly and voluntarily avow it rules out excusing a failure to display 
the attitude by appeal to misleading evidence on your attitudes, as a reporter 
might excuse such a failure; it amounts to a commitment not to try to escape 
that cost, should it be incurred.
•	 Since	the	avowal	of	an	attitude	is	more	costly	than	reporting	the	attitude—
reporting it as you might report the attitudes of another—it is also more 
credible than a mere report; and being more credible it is likely to be more 
appealing: it will have a better chance of shaping the expectations of your audi-
ence and coordinating with them to your mutual benefit.
•	 You	 can	make	 your	 ascriptions	 of	 future	 actions	more	 credible	 and	more	
appealing in a parallel way, by strengthening an avowal into a promise. Like 
the avowal, the promise rules out the excuse of having been misled about your 
attitudes when you fail to act according to an attitude previously avowed. But 
it also rules out the excuse of having changed your mind since making the 
avowal. Promise that you’ll meet me at the theater and you cannot claim in 
later excuse either that you got your intention wrong or that a better opportu-
nity presented itself and you dropped the intention.7
What these points emphasize is that if you are a personal agent, then there are 
very exacting expectations to which we, your interlocutors, will hold you. We will 
expect you in suitable areas to be able to speak with authority to what you believe 
and desire and intend; to be willing to make commitments to us— avowals or 
promises—and not just to report on yourself as you might report on another; to 
prove capable of living up to those commitments in the general run, displaying the 
beliefs and desires, the intentions and actions, to which your words testify; and, 
where you occasionally fail to live up to those words, to be able to recognize the 
failures and to be willing to make excuses or apologies that suggest a determina-
tion to improve. Being a personal agent, you will be expected to prove yourself a 
conversable agent too: someone we find it possible to reach in the realm of words 
and to engage to our mutual benefit.
The fact that we tie your agential status to such a rich array of expectations 
means that if you are not an agent—or at least not an agent for whom your words 
speak—then that will show up very quickly. And the fact that those expectations 
are very exacting means that as you begin to meet the expectations, it will quickly 
7 The fact of having avowed a belief does not give you a new reason for believing it; should the evi-
dence change, you can excusably change your belief. But the fact of having promised to do something 
does give you a new reason for desiring and acting accordingly: it puts your reputation at stake and 
constrains any changes of mind.
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become plausible that you are an agent.8 Induction plays a central role in the exer-
cise of establishing that you are a personal, conversable agent but the exercise is 
very different from the inductive procedure that we have to follow with the robot 
in our earlier example. To put the difference in a slogan, it involves induction from 
interpersonal interaction rather than induction from impersonal interaction.
We see that you are a personal agent in virtue of probing your attitudes, eliciting 
avowals and promises, and finding that you do not let us down: that is, in virtue 
of vindicating your status in interaction with us. Or we see that you are an agent 
by learning of the pattern of interpersonal interaction that you enjoy with third 
parties. We rely just on induction from evidence of impersonal interaction in the 
case of a non-personal agent like the robot, whether this be a form of interaction 
we sponsor in experiment or register as mere observers: whether in that sense it be 
direct or indirect. But in the case of personal agents like you and any other human 
being we can also rely on induction from evidence of interpersonal interaction, 
whether this be interaction in which we directly engage or interaction with third 
parties that we learn about indirectly.
4.3. Recognizing Group Agents
The discussion so far suggests that if groups are agents, then they may be 
non-personal agents like robots and animals or personal agents like you and me. 
And it suggests that whether they count as agents of one or the other kind will cor-
relate with the sort of evidence we find appropriate for establishing their agency. 
I argue for two theses in this section, one positive, the other negative. First, that we 
can certainly establish the agency of some groups by finding them conversable in 
the manner of personal agents: that is, by interacting with them interpersonally 
or having evidence of such interaction with others. And second, that we cannot 
plausibly establish the agency of any group just on the basis of evidence, direct or 
indirect, of an impersonal form of interaction. The upshot is that the only groups 
we can plausibly expect to count as agents are groups that succeed in attaining 
conversability.
8 Notice, as registered in (List and Pettit 2011, Ch 1), that this extra evidence may serve in the case 
of a conversable agent to override the evidence of behavioral failure that might lead us to doubt the 
agency of an impersonal system. If you fail to behave according to the attitudes of which we have 
independent evidence but admit the failure, perhaps even apologizing for it, then that will provide an 
assurance that you are an agent that would be hard to attain in the case of a non-personal agent.
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4.3.1. Ascribing group agency on the basis of interpersonal interaction
Most of the groups that make a persuasive claim to count as agents speak for them-
selves in the manner of individual human beings, having individuals or bodies 
that serve as corporate spokespersons. In claiming to speak for the group—that is, 
for all the members—on any issue, such spokespersons lay claim to an authority, 
based on the individual acquiescence of members to live up to the words they utter 
on the group’s behalf. Thus the agential status of the group will be manifest in the 
fact that the declarations that the spokespersons make are ones that other mem-
bers honor, acting as the words require of them, now in this situation, now in that. 
As we deal with the group through its spokespersons, we find that it vindicates 
its status as an agent by how it interacts with us. And we find no difficulty in this, 
since the authority claimed and manifested by spokespersons testifies to explicit or 
implicit commitments on the part of members—presumably capable of confirma-
tion in individual interaction with them—to abide by the utterances of suitable 
representatives.
The spokespersons for any group may be individuals or assemblies of individu-
als and while no group need have the same spokesperson on every issue, different 
spokespersons must speak with a single voice, ensuring by whatever means that 
the avowals and promises they make on behalf of the group form a coherent whole. 
The group’s accepted mode of organization and decision-making will usually 
ensure this coherence among spokespersons, as it will ensure that members know 
how they are required to behave by the utterances of such authorities (French 
1984; List and Pettit 2011). A group agent may fail on occasion to live up to those 
utterances, of course, as an individual may fail too. But the mode of organization 
ought at least to make it capable in such a case of proving responsive to complaints 
about the breakdown, enabling it to recognize when an excuse is available, or an 
apology due, and to act accordingly.
What sorts of declarations do spokespersons make on behalf of a group agent? 
They avow the beliefs of the group, as when the church outlines its tenets of 
faith, the political party presents its analysis of the economy, or the corporation 
explains why its profits fell in a recent quarter. They avow equally the wishes 
and values and intentions of the group as when the church expounds what it 
stands for, the party embraces certain principles or policies, and the corpora-
tion endorses a strategic statement and a statement of medium-term tactics. 
And they promise future action in one or another domain, as when the church 
promises greater openness about priestly abuse, the party commits itself to one 
or another initiative in government, and the corporation enters contracts with 
its suppliers and customers.
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Is it excessive to take the declarations of spokespersons to be avowals and prom-
ises? Absolutely not, for the declarations are taken in common usage to rule out 
excuses of misleading evidence or change of mind in the way that is character-
istic of avowals and promises. Suppose a group fails to live up to a belief or value 
ascribed by an authorized spokesperson. It will not do for that spokesperson to 
excuse what was said on the grounds of having mistaken the evidence about what 
the group held. The spokesperson’s only recourse will be to resign from the role 
assigned by the group or, maintaining that role, to try to offer another excuse 
for the failure or to make an apology on the group’s behalf. Or suppose a group 
fails to live up to a promise that the spokesperson made on its behalf. In this case 
the spokesperson can invoke neither the misleading-evidence excuse nor the 
change-of-mind excuse. Again the alternatives will be as stark as before: resign, 
excuse on other grounds, or make an apology.
Let us assume that a group designates unique spokespersons in different 
domains, then, and that it robustly lives up to the words of its spokespersons. And 
let us assume, as this implies, that the voice supported by the different spokesper-
sons is reasonably coherent, offering a self-consistent, if developing story of the 
group’s attitudes. Or let us assume at least that, when the voice fails to be coherent, 
the spokespersons respect the demand to speak with one voice, making amend-
ments that restore coherence. If such conditions are fulfilled, then there can be 
little doubt about the grounds for treating the group as an agent. The words of 
the spokespersons project a robust pattern of goal-seeking, representation-guided 
action and the group is systematically organized to live up to those words and keep 
faith with the projected pattern.
More specifically, the words of the spokespersons project that robust pattern—
that pattern of evidentially and executively reliable performance—on the two 
fronts, internal and situational. On the internal front, they give us evidence that 
the members of the group will perform appropriately, living up to what the group 
demands of them, across a raft of variations in their personal attitudes: any varia-
tions, at any rate, that are consistent with their remaining committed to the group. 
And on the situational front, they indicate that the members of the group will per-
form appropriately as circumstances change, giving rise to a change in what atti-
tudes are supported or what action would be appropriate for enacting the group’s 
attitudes.
We have grounds at least as solid as in the robot case for treating such a collec-
tivity as an agent. Moreover, indeed, we have grounds that entitle us to treat it as 
a personal agent that can be held responsible for its attitudes, given the capacity 
it must have to take account of epistemic or evaluative critiques of the attitudes it 
embraces. The spokespersons that speak for the group, whether these be individuals 
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or assemblies, will presumably be as capable of responding to such challenges when 
they act for the group as they are when they act for themselves. They may refuse 
on occasion to answer a particular challenge but the pressures of credibility on any 
group that claims to support coherent attitudes, and to invite relationships with 
individuals and with other groups, will argue for not making a habit of such refusal. 
Within its domain of operation, it must purport and prove itself to be a conversable 
subject: an entity capable of being reached and engaged in speech.
The conditions identified in these observations are satisfied over and over in the 
social world. Our societies teem with commercial, ecclesiastical, associational and 
political groups, each with its own mode of organization, its own way of generat-
ing a single, self-representative voice and its own way of guaranteeing fidelity in 
action to the words uttered in its name. As the law of incorporation has grown over 
the last century or so, these entities have become ever more powerful, gaining a 
capacity to act in different areas, to change their area of action as they will, to adopt 
and amend the goals that they pursue there, and to do all of this on the basis of 
resources that are strictly corporate, with the liability of members for group bank-
ruptcy being severely limited.
4.3.2. Ascribing group agency from evidence of impersonal interaction
Evidence of interpersonal interaction, direct or indirect, would clearly be suffi-
cient for thinking of certain groups as agents: specifically, as conversable agents. 
But is evidence of interpersonal interaction necessary for establishing the status of 
a group as an agent? Or might the evidence of impersonal interaction alone suffice 
to establish a group’s claim to agency, and presumably to agency of a non-personal 
kind? Might we be reasonably led to cast a group as an agent just by finding that 
it displays an agential pattern of interaction of broadly the kind illustrated by 
the robot? In particular, might we be reasonably led to do this without making 
assumptions that can only be confirmed by recourse to evidence of interpersonal 
interaction? I argue that the answer is, no.9
Every group, in the nature of the case, is made up of individual human beings, 
each with a mind of their own. Thus whatever goal-seeking patterns are postu-
lated at the group level, they have to emanate from individual actions: the actions 
whereby some or all of the members do their bit, whatever that is, in sustaining 
the group-level patterns. And whatever representations are supposed to guide 
9 Questions naturally arise about what to say of groups where the evidence from interpersonal 
interaction is mixed—for example, where would-be spokespersons are in conflict—but the evidence 
of impersonal interaction is strong: for example, it suggests that some of the spokespersons are reli-
able, others not. I do not address such questions here but stick for simplicity to the purer cases.
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the group in its fidelity to those patterns, they have to be formed on the basis of 
representations formed in some or all of its members: the members, after all, are 
the group’s eyes and ears. If we are to treat a group as an agent, then there has 
to be good ground for expecting that it will robustly display any goal-seeking, 
representation-guided patterns we postulate. And that means that there has to 
be good ground for expecting that it will do this over possible variations in how, 
independently of the group, members individually see things and are individually 
disposed to act. It has to be evidentially and executively reliable, as we put it earlier, 
over certain variations on the internal front: that is, in the individuals who make 
it up.
The dependence of the behavior of a group on the intentional profiles of its mem-
bers generates a dilemma for anyone who thinks that observing the impersonal 
interaction of a group might be enough on its own to provide adequate evidence of 
group agency. Suppose that we come across a group such that its interaction with 
an impersonal environment—and such impersonal interaction only—suggests 
that there is a purpose or set of purposes that it is pursuing in light of representa-
tions it forms about the opportunities and means of action at its disposal. Either 
the behavior of members of the group will be intelligible just in light of their indi-
vidual profiles—their group-independent beliefs and desires. Or the behavior of 
the group will not be intelligible on that basis. And in neither case are we likely to 
think that the interaction of the group with its impersonal environment provides 
sufficient evidence for casting it as an agent.
If the behavior of the group is intelligible in light of the group-independent, 
individual profiles of members, then there will no reason to postulate a group 
agent, since the pattern displayed by the group as a whole will not be robust over 
relevant sorts of internal variation within the group:  that is, variations in the 
group-independent profiles of the members. Take the example of a market in some 
domain of commodities, which advances the purpose of establishing the relative 
prices at which those goods can be successfully cleared, in light of information 
about—and, we might think, a representation of—the level of aggregate demand. 
This apparently purposive-representational pattern ought not to lead us to think 
of the market as an agent. The pattern is only as robust as the group-independent 
desires of members to trade with one another at maximal returns to themselves.10
Let us turn now to the second possibility, that the pattern displayed in a group’s 
interaction with an impersonal environment—a pattern like that illustrated in 
10 And even if that were not thought to be an objection, canons of parsimony would argue against 
invoking group agency to explain a pattern that is already explicable by the group-independent pro-
files of the group’s members.
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the market—is not intelligible in light of the group-independent, individual pro-
files of its members. Might the evidence of such a pattern suffice on its own to 
establish the agency of the group? I do not think so. We would hardly find that 
pattern compelling unless we had some explanation as to why members should 
support it, given that they may be disposed by their group-independent attitudes 
to act in an unsupportive manner. And the only explanation that would have any 
plausibility in such a scenario would require confirmation, direct or indirect, by 
reference to interpersonal interaction. This explanation is that the members are 
committed to live up to avowals and promises made in their name: that in that 
sense their behavior is determined by group-dependent, not group-independent, 
attitudes.
Imagine that you are hovering in a helicopter and watching the rush hour traffic 
clog the main highway out of town. And suppose you notice that the line of traf-
fic is systematically blocking an ambulance from crossing that highway. All the 
crossings give priority to the highway and you see the ambulance being blocked, 
now at this crossing, now at another, now at a third. You might think of the traffic 
as a group agent that aims at frustrating the ambulance; after all, the evidence of 
its impersonal interaction with the ambulance suggests that that’s what it is doing. 
But could you sensibly reach that conclusion just on the basis of such evidence? 
I think not.
The problem is that, whatever the group-level evidence, you are bound to 
assume that individual drivers each have group-independent attitudes of their 
own; you are hardly going to take them to be automatons or zombies. And under 
that assumption it would be a miracle—a cosmic accident—if the attitudes 
robustly fell in line with the requirements of the alleged group goal. The only basis 
on which you could reasonably conclude that the traffic had an agential character, 
with the frustration of the ambulance as a goal, is the belief that the individual 
drivers are committed, as under a rule of authorized spokespersons, to the service 
of that group-level goal. You might not be clear about how they could be guided 
by a spokesperson and might even be forced to postulate channels of hidden elec-
tronic communication. But any such postulate, no matter how unlikely, would 
be more reasonable than taking them to constitute an agent, without reliance on 
the possibility of confirmation by direct or indirect evidence of interpersonal 
interaction.11
11 You might drop the belief in the agential status of the individuals, as certain radical ontologies 
would do. But this would be a resort of radical despair. For a critique of the option see Chapter 3 of my 
book The Common Mind (Pettit 1993).
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4.3.3. The bottom line
The considerations in this section suggest that under plausible epistemic sce-
narios, the only evidence that we can take as determinative of the presence of a 
group agent is evidence of interpersonal interaction. That means that the only sort 
of group we are ever likely to recognize as an agent is a conversable body. Such a 
group will have spokespersons that maintain a single voice and a mode of organi-
zation that gives credibility to their words, prompting other members to keep faith 
with those words when they act in the name of the group. It will count as a personal 
rather than a non-personal agent.
This line ought not to be surprising in view of the history of the concept of group 
agency. The concept emerged in medieval Europe, where guilds and orders and other 
novel entities flourished, and it quickly gained a wide currency. It applied to any 
group of people who united together in such a way that collectively they appeared 
in law, and figured in the courts, in the manner of an individual subject. The para-
digm example was the group that could own property and enter contracts, sue others 
and be sued in turn, and operate legally in the manner of an individual agent. What 
struck the legal theorists of the time was that in an entity like a guild or parish or 
town certain individuals or assemblies were authorized to speak for the corporate 
body, avowing the judgments or purposes of that body on the basis of the authority 
vested in them, and being entitled to speak for the body in promising to take one or 
another action. Such spokespersons were expected to maintain a coherence of voice, 
not holding by inconsistent claims or plans. And ordinary members of the body 
were required under the rules of incorporation to keep faith with the words given 
in their name, living up to the avowals and promises that their spokespersons made.
Congenially with the view developed here, the authorities or spokespersons in 
this image were generally cast as playing a representative role, and groups were 
held to perform as agents just to the extent that the members rallied behind the 
words of their representatives. Thus in 1354, Albericus de Rosciate could say that a 
collegial agent, although it is constituted out of many members, is one by virtue of 
representation: collegium, licet constituatur ex pluribus, est tamen unum per repre-
sentationem (Eschmann 1944, 33, fn 145). The theme dominates the work of legal 
theorists of the time like Bartolus of Sasseferrato and his pupil, Baldus de Ubaldis, 
who make much of the way a suitably represented group, in particular the repre-
sented people of a city, could figure as a corporate agent or person (Woolf 1913; 
Canning 1983). Arguing that the populus liber, the free people of a city republic, 
is a corporate person, Baldus explains that this is because the council—the repre-
sentative, rotating council—represents the mind of that people: concilium repre-
sentat mentem populi (Canning 1987, 198).
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This conversability criterion makes clear why churches and political parties and 
commercial firms are certainly group agents. But, to go back to earlier examples, 
the model makes equally clear why there is no temptation to ascribe group agency 
to the bond market, or the X-generation, or even the group of people who coordi-
nate their efforts to save a swimmer.
There is no purpose pursued as such by the bond-market or the X-generation, 
no pressure on them to agree on representations to guide the pursuit of that pur-
pose, and so no basis for expecting them to perform robustly as agents in their own 
right. But what of the beach group? The members in this sort of group do have a 
shared purpose, and do agree on the means of furthering it, and there may seem to 
be a better case for treating it as an agent.
On reflection, however, it should be clear that this sort of group will not consti-
tute a group agent either. There is no reason to expect such a group to display the 
internal or situational robustness that we associate with agency. We might be able 
to predict on the basis of the individual character of the members that faced with 
a similar crisis in the mountains, they would almost certainly respond in some 
equally altruistic way. But there would be nothing about the group as such—noth-
ing about its authorization of spokespersons or the mode of its organization—that 
would support such extrapolation across changes of situation, let alone changes in 
its internal make-up.12
4.4. The Reality of Group Agents
Despite the fact that the argument provided appears to support the reality of con-
versable group agents—and only indeed of group agents of that kind—a common 
approach suggests that still such agents should count only as fictions. They may 
perform as if they were agents but really they are not. They are merely the projec-
tions of the individual agents who make them up; they are the fronts or avatars 
behind which the members, who are the only real agents, operate for their own 
purposes.
12 In the beach case there is certainly a joint action on the part of the participants, sponsored by 
a joint intention that they form. This might materialize insofar as it is manifest to each that they all 
want to save the swimmer, that they can do so only together, that the salient way of doing so is to link 
arms and form a chain into the water, and that if anyone starts the chain then others will join up. Joint 
intention is certainly required for the formation of a group agent, as that is described here; it is implicit 
in the acquiescence of members in the identification of spokespersons and in the authorization of 
their words. But necessary as joint intention may be for the formation of a group agent, it is not suf-
ficient on its own to ensure the presence of such an agent (Pettit and Schweikard 2006; List and Pettit 
2011) There is a large literature on what occurs when people form and act on a joint intention; see for 
example (Tuomela 1995; Bratman 1999; Gilbert 2001). The account that fits best with my comments 
here is probably Bratman’s.
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This sort of fiction theory goes back to Thomas Hobbes (1994, Ch 16), in par-
ticular to his discussion of how a group of individuals can authorize a spokesper-
son to speak for them, thereby constituting a conversable body, capable of making 
and living up to commitments (Skinner 2010). Hobbes, a seventeenth-century 
philosopher, stands out among his predecessors for insisting that the spokes-
person that speaks for a group has to be capable of performing as a pre-existing 
agent or agency. His idea is that a corporate agent will form just insofar as such a 
pre-existing agent or agency takes on the role of spokesperson for members of the 
group. ‘A multitude of men are made one person, when they are by one man, or 
one person, represented’. But their spokesperson or representative may be a com-
mittee, not just an individual, provided that the committee forms its judgments 
by majority vote, making suitable accommodation for ties: ‘if the representative 
consist of many men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the 
voice of them all’.
Hobbes assumes that the spokesperson for any group agent exists prior to the 
formation of that entity as an independent individual or committee and pro-
vides unity for the group agent insofar as its words can be treated as the words of 
the group, not ‘truly’, but ‘by fiction’.13 Thus in order to deflate the representation 
whereby group agents form—he often describes this as personation—he insists 
that it involves nothing more than the representation whereby an individual may 
speak for a wholly inanimate object, as in asserting its rights. ‘There are few things 
that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, a 
hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer’.
Does the account given here support the sort of fiction theory that Hobbes 
espouses and that continues to be espoused in contemporary circles, particularly 
among economists and economically minded lawyers (Grantham 1998)? No, it 
does not. It is possible in principle for a group agent to form around a single, dic-
tatorial spokesperson, as Hobbes envisages, but this would be a degenerate case 
of group agency; it might be as well cast as an example of an individual agent with 
a multitude of helpers. And, even more importantly, it is not possible for a group 
agent to form around a single, majoritarian committee, whether this be an elite 
committee or a committee of the whole.
Hobbes assumes, as many assumed before and since, that a committee can func-
tion like an individual agent, mechanically generating its judgments and purposes 
13 This fiction theory is important to Hobbes, since it undermines the idea that the common-
wealth—for him, the supreme group agent—might be formed on the basis of a mixed, republican 
constitution that requires different spokespersons to agree in determining the voice of the state. He 
thought that such a constitution would create civil war, rejecting it on the grounds that it would cre-
ate ‘not one independent commonwealth, but three independent factions’ (Hobbes 1994, Ch 29, s 6).
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from the bottom up via majority voting. That is why he thinks that a committee 
can serve like a dictator to speak for a group and establish it as a conversable agent, 
capable of entering and keeping commitments. But it turns out that he is quite 
mistaken about that, as the discursive dilemma makes clear (Pettit 2001, Ch 5; List 
2006). A majoritarian committee cannot reliably function like an independent 
agent, in the way Hobbes envisages, because majority voting among individually 
consistent members can generate inconsistency in the group judgments on vari-
ous connected issues.
Suppose that you, Bloggs and I want to form a group agent and that we must 
decide on the attitudes of the group on three propositions, ‘p’, ‘q’ and ‘p&q’. You and 
Bloggs may vote for ‘p’, I against, and Bloggs and I for ‘q’, you against. How then will 
we cast our votes on ‘p&q’? You and I will vote against and only Bloggs vote for. 
Thus our majority voting pattern will lead us as a group into embracing, incoher-
ently, the package: p, q, not-p&q. We will then face a discursive dilemma. Let that 
package stand and we must reject the aspiration to collective rationality. Alter the 
package so as to ensure collective rationality and we must reject the aspiration to 
individual responsiveness.
This simple observation shows that the majoritarian committee cannot be 
recruited to the role of a spokesperson, allowing the group for which it speaks to 
count as an agent. In order for the three of us to establish a group agent we have to 
follow a procedure that targets the requirements for such an agent to exist, ensur-
ing in particular that it is reliably consistent and coherent. Thus we might follow a 
straw-vote procedure under which every attitude supported by a majority vote is 
checked for consistency with other attitudes adopted; if it is consistent, we endorse 
it; and if it is not consistent, as in the case illustrated, we make a decision on which 
member of the conflicting subset to reject, whether that be the new candidate 
or something accepted in the past. This might lead us as a group to endorse the 
claims ‘p, q, p&q’, as it might have led us to endorse ‘not-p, q, not-p&q’, ‘p, not-q, 
not-p&-q’. In any such event it will enable us to preserve collective rationality, and 
to allow us to form a group agent, but require us to sacrifice individual, majoritar-
ian responsiveness; there will be at least one proposition we endorse as a group 
that a majority of members individually reject.
The group agent that we might form in this way, via the straw-vote procedure, 
is not an agent that we, an independently existing agency, go through the motions 
of representing, giving it a fictional existence. No, it is a group agent that comes 
into existence by dint of our individual efforts, in particular our efforts to ensure 
that the conditions for the existence of the group agent are met. As individual, 
bottom-up voting proceeds, we gather feedback on the emerging pattern of judg-
ments and purposes that this would generate for the group and, when necessary, 
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we act top-down to ensure that that pattern is fit for agency: we suspend the effect 
of a vote and revise the overall results of voting, past and present, so as to ensure 
our coherence as a group agent. Before the appearance of that group agent, we 
exist as individuals, of course, being required to bring the group into existence. But 
before its appearance there is no other agent or agency—nothing like the dictato-
rial spokesperson—such that by contrast with that entity the group agent created 
is merely a fiction.
The discursive dilemma shows that one particular pattern of bottom-up respon-
siveness to member votes— that which majority voting would ensure—is ruled 
out by the requirement of collective rationality and so that a majority commit-
tee could not play the agential, representative role that the fiction theory of group 
agents requires. But could a group agent be represented in any other bottom-up 
way—say, under another other voting system—by a single committee or indeed by 
a network of committees with complementary tasks? No, it could not. The recent 
impossibility theorems on judgment-aggregation generalize the lesson illustrated 
by the discursive dilemma and support that negative line (List and Pettit 2002; 
List and Polak 2010). They show, roughly, that when individuals construct a group 
agent—a reliably rational entity—the exercise will be effective only if the judg-
ments and purposes they assign to the group are not constrained to be a reflection, 
majoritarian or otherwise, of the corresponding attitudes of the members. And 
that means, as in the straw-vote case, that the individuals have to construct a group 
agent de novo: they have to construct an agent such that there is no pre-existing 
agency—no pre-existing spokesperson—in comparison with which it might look 
like a fiction.
And so to the denouement. It may be, as we saw earlier, that the only plausible 
basis for ascribing agency to groups is evidence of interpersonal interaction, and 
that only groups whose members organize to make them conversable have a claim 
to constitute agents. But still, so our concluding observations suggest, such a group 
agent is not just a fiction or pretense: a dummy agent that reflects only the voices 
of a ventriloquist master, in the way in which the dicatatorial agent would reflect 
the voice of the dictator. Any group agent will be the same collection as the set of its 
members at or over time, since it does not have any existence apart from them. But 
it will not be the same agent.14 Indeed, prior to the formation of the group entity, 
14 A further consideration in support of this view is that a given collection of individuals might 
constitute one group agent, with its own commitments, in one context, and a different group agent, 
with different commitments, in another. The town council might have just the same members, for 
example, as the hospital board. To hold that either group was the same agent as its members would be 
to imply, absurdly, that the town council is the same agent as the hospital board.
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the collection of individuals who construct it will not be an agent of any kind; as 
Hobbes would say, it will be merely a multitude.15
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